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Introduction 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, modes of business representation across the 
capitalist democracies seem worlds apart. Despite pressures associated with 
postindustrialization, the “macrocorporatist” Scandinavian countries maintain highly centralized, 
national employers’ peak associations that engage in wage and policy-making negotiations with 
highly centralized labor unions and government bureaucrats. In Germany and other continental 
European countries, national employers’ associations have lost power in both political 
representation and collective bargaining. But employers’ industry-level groups continue to 
coordinate collective firm activities and to negotiate sectoral (often private) cooperative 
agreements with their workers, or what we might call “sector coordination.” Finally, an aversion to 
cooperation appears bred in the bone in the Anglo-liberal lands of Britain and the United States: 
highly fragmented or “pluralist” associations organize employers and workers, and the 
representation of business interests remains a highly individualistic affair.1 
This article explores the origins of peak employers’ associations around the dawn of the 
twentieth century to understand why countries produce highly centralized macrocorporatist 
groups, weaker national associations but stronger industry-level groups, or highly fragmented 
pluralist associations. We argue that government actors led in the creation of peak employers’ 
organizations; therefore, party competition had a significant impact on the evolution of the 
associations into their mature institutional forms. The terms of political engagement (set by 
party-system characteristics and state structure) influenced the political incentives of both public 
and private sector leaders and shaped the evolution of employers’ organizational capacities. 
First, the incentives for cooperation were much different in two-party systems than in 
multiparty systems. In the former, large umbrella parties tended to include employers as well as 
other social actors, employers were often dispersed across parties, and right parties could 
reasonably hope to win electoral majorities and had little reason to compromise with the other 
parties. In these cases there emerged a fragmented, pluralist system of business representation. 
Countries with multiparty systems, however, were likely to have partisan organizations dedicated 
to the interests of specific social groups (such as labor, business, and farmers), and each party 
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had a political incentive to cooperate with the others in order to participate in the governing 
coalitions. Moreover, these business-oriented parties recognized their limited chance to win an 
electoral majority and sought to delegate policy-making power to social actors in private 
institutions; they thus had a strategic reason for nurturing labor-market coordination. 
In turn, a second political feature influenced the level of coordination: the degree of state 
centralization versus federalism. Countries with strong national governments were more likely to 
produce a national dedicated business party, which covered the interests of most companies and 
served to develop the collective voice of business: these countries produced encompassing, 
macrocorporatist employers’ associations. In federal countries, by contrast, diverse business 
parties developed at the regional level and employer organizations remained fixed at the sectoral 
level. 
We also acknowledge other causes for employer organization: the structure of the 
economy and features of labor (strength of labor militancy and levels of skills associated with 
preindustrial guilds). Yet we argue that these explanations are bounded, as they suffer from 
some inconsistencies, fit uneasily with the empirical data, and do not capture the full story. For 
example, both high levels of labor militancy and strong norms of social cooperation are said to 
spur cooperation in coordinated countries.2 But these motivations for coordination suggest quite 
different relations between the social classes, and while guilds motivate cooperation to secure 
collective goods, labor activism inspires defensive action to contain militancy. 
Recognizing the causal salience of the structure of political competition supplements and 
improves upon other theories of associational development in several ways. First, association 
building at the industry level and at the national, multisector level relies on substantially different 
processes. Economic structures, labor activism, and preindustrial cooperation are highly salient 
for the evolution of sectoral or regional employers’ organizations. But national, multisectoral, 
peak employers’ associations require a moment of disconnect in social life, in order to overcome 
the high transaction costs of group formation beyond the industry level. Timing is also important 
in that national patterns are solidified when regional economies and political communities 
become incorporated into national and even global structures. As we demonstrate in our case 
histories, the leadership for the development of peak employers’ associations came from 
business-oriented party activists and bureaucrats seeking to advance industrial development 
policy and to solve specific problems of political control. Business-oriented party leaders and 
bureaucrats in both predemocratic and democratic regimes feared the rising tide of democracy 
and labor activism. They therefore viewed the employer organization as a useful tool for political 
control because it could secure parliamentary advantage and serve as a societal counterweight 
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to working-class activism. Political leadership was vital to the emergence of these peak 
associations, and the structure of political competition played a decisive role in the structure of 
these groups. 
Second, political agency becomes more important at those critical junctures where the 
range of possible actions and impacts of outcomes are expanded and the structure of political 
competition shapes the strategic choices of political actors. The dawn of the twentieth century 
constituted a moment of enhanced opportunity for building institutions for labor-market 
coordination. An ideology of cooperation gripped employers across the Western world during this 
period. It was a time when national industrial development policies, highly organized peak 
employers’ associations, and labor-market coordination came to be viewed as solutions to the 
rise of national economies, the globalization of trade, and the need to transfer regulatory 
privilege from agriculture to industry. While experiments in building peak employers’ associations 
articulated very similar ambitions for high levels of nonmarket coordination, these parallel 
experiments ultimately produced different organizational forms. And party competition played a 
major role in producing these diverse outcomes. 
Finally, as we have argued elsewhere, there is a “dynamic and mutually-reinforcing 
relationship between the spheres of industrial relations and political party competition.”3 Our 
investigation of the historical circumstances surrounding the emergence of national patterns of 
business organization helps to unravel the reciprocal influences of movement in the two spheres 
and highlights the element of historical contingency that may be overlooked in less historically 
grounded studies. 
 
The Collective Organization of Business 
This article questions why countries differ in their development of encompassing and 
centralized national peak associations and in their broader levels of employer coordination. First, 
some nations produce multisector and centralized national associations that minimize sectoral 
disputes (what we call macrocorporatism); second, some create predominately sectoral level 
and privately driven cooperative associations (sectoral coordination); and third, some develop 
fragmented groups with considerable intrabusiness competition (pluralism).4 
While peak employers’ associations and coordination had been relatively weak 
everywhere at the end of the nineteenth century, divergence among nations along the paths of 
macrocorporatism, sectoral coordination, and pluralism were pronounced by the 1920s and more 
so in the 1930s, even though full-blown macrocorporatist coordination did not develop until after 
the Second World War.5 Table 1 documents this divergence in employer organization in the early 
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decades of the twentieth century for sixteen (now advanced industrialized) nations. The table 
reports the level of employer coordination on two core dimensions. First, a macrocorporatist 
dimension captures the scope and centralization of national peak employers’ associations, their 
policy-making authority, the corresponding density of labor organization, and collective 
bargaining centralization. Second, a sector coordination dimension captures typical sectoral 
cooperation on things such as training, research and development, and export marketing, as well 
as the strength of long-term finance and producer relations. (See the appendix.) 
The Scandinavian polities of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden and the Benelux nations 
displayed increasingly strong macrocorporatist organization of employers (with moderate 
sectoral cooperation) during the early decades of the twentieth century. The Germanic nations 
and Italy exhibited moderate macrocorporatist employers’ organizations and strong sectoral 
cooperation during this period. The Anglo-liberal polities (and Finland and France) were 
characterized by pronounced pluralist employers’ organization: the development of 
encompassing, centralized, and integrated national peak associations and sectoral coordination 
remained low in these systems from the turn of the century until World War II. 
 
Party Competition and the Origins of Employers’ Associations 
Our central question is to understand why countries produced peak multisector 
employers’ associations in the mold of macrocorporatism, sectoral coordination, or pluralism. We 
argue that the structure of political competition shaped the strategic choices of employers and 
sympathetic politicians and significantly influenced the development of the various forms of peak 
employers’ associations. Both employers and party leaders or bureaucrats on the right had 
incentives for forming encompassing employers’ associations. Yet structural features of party 
politics—multiple versus two-party systems and federal versus centralized 
governments—significantly determined the outcomes of these struggles to create collective 
institutions. 
Employers had incentives to develop national business organizations and other 
nonmarket methods of coordination at the turn of the twentieth century to shift policy privilege 
from agriculture to industry and to contain labor activism. Inspired by ideas of developmental 
capitalism, they sought national rather than regional policy solutions to the challenges of (1) 
industrialization, (2) state supports for competing in world markets and for protecting the home 
turf from invasive imports, (3) arrangements to restrict the cut-throat competition of laissez-faire 
capitalism, and (4) investments in skills.6 
Politicians on the right in both democratic and predemocratic regimes also had incentives 
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for nurturing encompassing national business associations during this period, as these groups 
served several political purposes. Party leaders had electoral incentives to nurture groups that 
would solidify their constituent base and to reach out to potential business constituents who 
belonged to other parties but who shared the goal of advancing capitalist development. 
Bureaucrats were motivated to organize employers to gain political support for help in passing 
legislation or help in implementing public policies. Finally, political leaders sympathetic to 
employers had incentives to delegate power to private forums, when they believed that those in 
such nonlegislative arenas could more readily advance their policy ambitions and social class 
constituency’s interests.7 Although the political authority was not transferred through democratic 
elections, predemocratic political parties were important in parliaments; indeed, incentives for 
leaders on the right to build up party power and to cultivate employers’ associations to bolster 
their own political power may have been stronger in predemocratic regimes than in democratic 
ones.8 While conservative elites worried about the working-class threat across systems, elites in 
predemocratic regimes feared revolution. 
Although party leaders and employers everywhere had a shared interest in business 
organization, the specific forms of peak employers’ associations were deeply influenced by the 
structure of party competition. Two political features, in particular, had a critical impact on the 
strategic choices of party leaders in their institution-building efforts: the structure of parties (two 
versus multiple parties) and the degree of federalism versus centralization.9 
First, the number of parties mattered, in that multiparty systems are more likely than 
two-party systems to produce dedicated business parties, to inspire cooperation among social 
actors, and to delegate policy-making power to private channels. Multiparty systems have higher 
coverage of specific groups, so that employers are more likely to belong to a single party. But as 
discussed below, in federal systems of government, these dedicated business parties are likely 
to remain regional. Dedicated national business parties inspire coordination, by focusing 
attention on common goals among constituents and making credible promises to members; 
consequently, their platforms do not fluctuate to appeal to the median voter, as occurs in 
two-party systems.10 Coalition governments—usual in multiparty systems—further encourage 
cooperation among competing interests (which must form governments) and stable policy 
outcomes. Leaders of business parties under these conditions have incentives to delegate 
policy-making authority to private channels, because they are unlikely to win electoral majorities. 
Their constituents are more likely to secure favorable policy outcomes via direct negotiations 
with workers than via parliamentary processes. 
In comparison, two-party systems tend to consist of catchall parties that bring varied 
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constituencies under the partisan umbrella. Employers may be dispersed among parties, and 
parties may seek to cultivate competing business associations. When employers belong to 
competing parties, they may feel that no single group speaks for them and may be more resistant 
to government regulation than would be the case in countries where a dedicated business party 
represents their interests. Employers in catchall parties are less likely to believe the policy 
promises of party leaders, because parties’ positions fluctuate to attract the median voter; in 
addition, even if a party follows through on its promises to employers, it may be voted out of 
office in the next election and all will be lost.11 Party leaders in this system may be less willing to 
delegate policy-making authority to private actors, because they are less identified with these 
actors and because they have hopes of winning outright electoral victories. Thus two-party 
systems tend to experience policy fluctuations and less stable regulatory climates for business; 
the promises of politicians are less believable, government figures are less willing to delegate 
authority, and employers have greater difficulty creating organizations for coordination. 
A second feature of political engagement matters enormously to the formation of peak 
employers’ associations—the level at which political competition is organized. Centralized 
governments produce national, centrally organized, and regionally homogenous parties, 
because the political action largely takes place at the national level. These countries tend to 
engender well-organized corporatist associations as well. In stark contrast, parties and public 
policies tend to vary materially and ideologically across regions in federal systems of government 
with their decentralized political authority. This geographical variation engenders regionally 
fragmented associations, because the region is the locus of much of the policy-making action. 
While centralized party systems are more likely to produce class-based political cleavages, 
federal party systems often divide the electorate along class, regional, religious, and/ or ethnic 
lines and are more likely to include employers and workers within the same party. Thus, the 
institutionalization of national versus regional parties has a feedback impact on social 
structures.12 
To sum up, the characteristics of partisan representation—the number of parties and their 
degree of centralization—permit a rather simple parsing out of the worlds of business politics. 
First, centralized, multiparty systems tend to produce encompassing and highly coordinated 
corporatist associations with a high level of state involvement (macrocorporatism). These party 
systems delegate significant policy-making authority to the peak associations, but industrial 
relations systems retain a strong role for government, because employers trust that their 
dedicated business parties will represent their interests in political channels. 
Second, countries with two-party systems (either centralized or decentralized) tend to 
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produce pluralist employer representation, in which no unitary peak group can claim to speak for 
collective business interests. These party systems do not delegate much policy-making authority 
to organized business and labor. That is because even when one party becomes significantly 
linked to business (for example, the U.S. Republican Party in 1896), the business-oriented party 
can hope to win an outright majority. In countries with centralized, two-party systems, the central 
government may periodically seek to impose high levels of coordination on business and labor 
(as in Britain), but the gains are then likely to be reversed when the opposing party gains power. 
These countries, that is, may exhibit greater levels of coordination than countries with federal 
two-party systems, but their experiments in coordination are time limited. 
Third, federalist, decentralized multiparty systems are likely to produce high levels of 
employer coordination at the industry level (sector coordination), but they have weaker peak 
associations and less state involvement. Federal multiparty systems have difficultly producing 
dedicated national business parties, because sectional cleavages remain salient. Moreover, 
while business-oriented politicians have incentives to delegate political authority to social 
partners, the absence of a single business party makes employers more resistant to state 
oversight. 
We present these theoretical predictions in Table 2 and denote four model groups of 
countries that fit the type of party system and state structure for each combination of the two 
factors. Space constraints of this article do not permit a full quantitative analysis of cross-national 
variations in coordination. Nonetheless, our historical, qualitative case study material on four 
prototypical countries helps substantiate our claims, and the simple “cross- tabulation” of political 
institutional dimensions in Table 2 produces some suggestive information about our theoretical 
predictions.13 Computing group means for the 1900–1938 country-decades (displayed in each 
cell), one finds significant differences in average macrocorporatism and sector coordination 
across multiparty and two-party systems (using a t-test for difference of means). Multiparty 
systems and centralized polities have relatively high macro-corporatism with moderate sector 
coordination while multiparty, federal systems have strong sector coordination and moderate 
macrocorporatism. While both centralized and fragmented polities have low sector coordination, 
centralized, two-party systems display modestly higher macrocorporatist employer organization 
than federal, two-party systems. 
 
Linkages between Party and IndustrIal Relation Systems 
Certainly the structure of political competition was not the only determinant of variations 
in employers’ multisector peak associations. In the following discussion we consider other factors 
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that appear in the scholarly literature. While acknowledging their strengths, we also discuss their 
limitations in capturing the entire story of business organization. In particular, we explore two 
broad sets of variables—the structure of industry and the features of the working class. Finally, 
we reflect on the interaction between these various theoretical arguments, paying particular 
attention to the evolving complementarities between the structure of party and industrial relations 
systems. 
At the outset, we reject the proposition that national variations in employer organization 
simply conformed to deep ideological and cultural norms. From the standpoint of the present, 
nothing may seem surprising about macrocorporatism in Denmark, sectoral coordination in 
Germany, and pluralism in Britain. Each country has its own foundation myth of the exceptional 
circumstances that account for its trajectory in the pantheon of national permutations: think of 
British regard for individual agency versus German affection for the state. Yet these patterns of 
coordination—seemingly indelibly imprinted on national psyches—were much less distinctive a 
century ago. The ideological underpinnings of nationalist industrial development and peak 
employer organization were essentially the same across advanced nations and differed 
fundamentally from countries’ earlier conceptions of collectivism. Moreover, ideological 
determinacy fails to capture the peculiar ironies of national trajectories. The ancien régime 
persisted in Burkean ideals of old Tory England and similarly struck a responsive chord with 
German conceptions of organic society. Despite the importance of the state in German ideology, 
Germany produced sectoral coordination with little state involvement, and the British conception 
of a National Industrial Council after World War I inspired coordination across advanced 
societies.14 
One set of explanations attributes the variations in employer coordination to differences 
in industrial structure that reflect the stage and type of capitalist development. Yet while 
industrialization broadly accounts for the general timing of coordination, scholars hold diverse 
views about national propensities to organize. In some accounts, early industrializers organize in 
a “search for order” by forming sector trade associations or multisector umbrella organizations to 
manage competition, to assist in rapid industrial growth, and to protect against risk. In other 
accounts, late developers organized in order to catch up with their competitors.15 In like manner, 
some view those firms seeking to compete in international arenas as having a greater need for 
associations than domestic producers, because such associations offer collective support in 
battling the common enemy of foreign firms. Yet other scholars view countries with fewer 
exporting firms as having fewer wage pressures and therefore showing greater willingness to 
grant higher wages to labor and to cooperate with it.16 
 9  Martin, Swank 
High levels of regional or sectional diversity also inhibit the development of 
encompassing, centralized employers’ associations. Divisions over tariff reform, for example, 
constrained the national, multisector organization of employers in Britain and manufacturing and 
financial interests diverged dramatically over fiscal policy after World War I. Nevertheless, 
employers overcame diversity more readily in some countries than in others. Thus, Maier argues, 
British elites were more unified than German ones, due to the commercial needs of the landed 
gentry and to British public education.17 But German employers managed to reconcile 
differences between heavy and light industrial sectors in the face of democratic revolution after 
World War I, when they created the Reich Association of German Industry, whereas British 
employers at that time failed to produce a single encompassing employers’ association. 
Another set of explanations for cross-national differences in levels of employer 
organization points to (again contradictory) features of labor: employers organize either to resist 
labor activism or to achieve collective provision of skills for their highly productive workers. Some 
suggest that firms organize to stunt union militancy and that levels of business organization 
reflect the strength of worker mobilization. Industrial unions reinforce solidarity among workers of 
all skill levels and heighten capacities for cooperation with employers over training and wages; 
craft unions, by contrast, pursue self-interested strategies that benefit upper strata workers and 
motivate workers to control the numbers of people who may acquire the skills to practice a craft. 
Strong ethnic and religious cleavages also diminish the incentives of both worker organization 
and employers to organize.18 Other scholars argue that firms historically using highly skilled 
workers were more likely to organize in order to provide collective training mechanisms and to 
ensure labor peace. These skills levels were tied to preindustrial guild traditions, as guilds 
facilitated vocational training systems, allowed firms to develop specific assets, and enabled the 
development of a skills-based export sector.19 
These theories seem instinctively true but rely on different underlying processes for 
arriving at cooperative industrial relations. Each suffers from inconsistencies. Scholars attribute 
high levels of business organization in Denmark both to a highly mobilized labor movement and 
to a collectivist culture, yet it is hard to reconcile pitched warfare on the one hand with cozy 
coordination on the other. Moreover, economic and labor differences between the liberal and 
coordinated countries at the beginning of the 1900s are overstated; for example, large 
companies in prewar Germany began developing firm-based strategies for building skills and 
controlling labor that were similar to those advanced by their American counterparts.20  
Attributing a high level of employer organization to the presence or absence of 
preindustrial guilds is also somewhat problematic, in that guilds have a dual impact on 
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associational life. They have an economic impact in producing high skills and nonwage 
competition by employers, both of which foster cooperation; consequently, the decline of British 
guilds led to a drop in both skills and solidarity.21 Guilds also have a political impact in 
fragmenting political identities and inhibiting organization above the sectoral level; for example, 
the fractious Danish guilds failed to organize until a leader of the Right Party (Højre) induced 
them to join the manufacturers’ new multisectoral organization. In addition, craft unions elicited 
different business responses: when strong Danish craft unions sought to wrest control over skills 
from employers, firms organized at the national level to reclaim their managerial prerogative and 
to stabilize patterns of industrial engagement. Yet strong craft unions in Britain worked against 
multisector action, because employers shed skilled labor instead, and weak craft unions in the 
United States allowed business to remain fragmented. Whereas Sweden and Denmark have 
similar, highly corporatist peak employer associations, there are differences: Sweden has 
industrial unions and Denmark has craft unions.22 
Although we view industrial structure and labor arguments as having certain limitations in 
capturing the full variation of employer organization, we certainly do not wish to dismiss these 
explanations. Therefore, we offer four insights about the linkages between these industrial 
structure, labor-oriented, and party system explanations. 
First, the formation of business sectoral groups and national peak associations, in fact, 
relies on substantially different processes in each case. Sectoral and regional cooperative 
groups are motivated by specific labor-management conflicts or enabled by craft traditions of 
collective skills provision.23 But national group formation presupposes political will, as an 
enormous gulf divides a pluralist network of industry associations from a highly centralized, 
capacious peak organization with substantial power over its constituent groups. With the 
emergence of national industrial economies, local traditions for cooperation needed a major 
reworking, and the context of political competition had a powerful impact on these great 
transformations. 
Second, one might be concerned that the very structure of party systems was closely 
linked to economic cleavages, which also shaped business organization; in this way party 
systems are endogenous. Cusack et al., for example, suggest that the variation in workplace 
skills was an important determinant of the national adoption of proportional representation 
electoral systems in the 1920s. We acknowledge that in many cases European political parties 
emerged from economic interest groups; for instance, social democratic parties were created by 
organized labor, conservative parties had deep connections to the landowning gentry, and many 
economic cleavages were mirrored in partisan divides.24 At the same time, the relationship 
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between economic and party structures is complicated, because religious and ethnic 
cleavages—in addition to class cleavages—were significant sources of political parties. Thus, 
potential cleavages needed to be expressed politically and interpreted in order to form the bases 
for parties. Moreover, while many parties were created from the bottom up from economic 
interest groups, others were created from the top down by factions in the legislature. The latter, 
alternative route to party development diminished the importance of economic structure, by 
introducing new factors and agency into the calculus of party development.25 Thus, the process 
of party formation is itself a process of social construction and may reflect the idiosyncracies of 
agency at historical junctures that then have lasting legacies for future political engagement.  
Third, in the cauldron of late-nineteenth-century politics—with its attendant movements 
toward national and even international industrial economies and expanded 
democratization—partisan forms and institutions for labor relations were both evolving. We have 
elsewhere referred to this as a “dynamic and mutually-reinforcing relationship between the 
spheres of industrial relations and political party competition,” and Iversen and Soskice refer to 
the linkage between the two spheres as coevolution. This relationship may well be an example of 
what Capoccia and Ziblatt refer to as “reciprocal causality,” a matter for which an investigation of 
historical circumstance can best shed light on the directionality of causal findings.26 
Finally, the period from 1890 to the First World War was a critical juncture that presented 
an opening for coordination: the political responses at that moment lay the groundwork for the 
evolution of the future political economy. Just as liberalism swept through Europe in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, replacing mercantilism as the hegemonic ideology, an 
impulse for cooperation seemed ubiquitous from the late nineteenth century until shortly after the 
First World War. The organizing philosophy of nationalist industrial development inspired the 
images and structures of industrialization, and national peak associations were a key component. 
While the success of this new public philosophy depended, in part, on its congruence with older 
philosophical traditions, political structure and agency had an indelible impact on national 
responses at this critical moment.27 
A weak version of our argument is that the preindustrial skills tradition defines the basic 
cleavage between coordinated and uncoordinated business communities but that the political 
features of nation-states (party structure and federalism) explain the differences in levels of 
coordination, as is found between countries with macrocorporatism and sectoral coordination. A 
stronger version of the argument suggests that political structures had a feedback impact on 
economic development: two-party systems with little incentive to nurture strong national 
employers’ associations rewarded employers who engaged in low-skills competition while 
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hampering the establishment of future collective skills-building institutions. 
To assess the effects of the structure of political competition on employers’ organization, 
we offer comparative case studies of Denmark, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. 
We employ these cases to demonstrate that the causal argument had its intended effect using 
process tracing, or the careful temporal reconstruction of the cases. We identify intermediate 
steps between cause and effect and use our qualitative data to construct analytic narratives to 
reveal the underlying incentives to produce action.28 
For each nation, we suggest that the political rules of the game will have foundational 
impacts on association building. The structure of party competition will influence whether a 
dedicated business party develops and business-oriented party leaders and bureaucrats should 
be directly involved in the creation of the groups. The groups should all initially seek high levels 
of coordination, and the incentives for government actors to delegate policy-making authority 
should be shaped by party competition.  
 
The Case of Denmark 
The dynamics of partisan competition demonstrate how Denmark came to create a 
macrocorporatist peak employers’ association that organized industrial relations with 
government and labor at a very high level. First, the character of party organization—the 
centralization of political competition within a multiparty system—led to the creation of a 
dedicated business party. The Danish system of partisan representation included three main 
parties (Højre on the right, Venstre for rich farmers, Social Democrats on the left) and a small 
faction, Moderate Venstre. Højre was something of a cross-class party through the 1880s, 
including most of the countries’ employers and government bureaucrats, as well as a large 
number of the urban working class (ranging from 16 to 40 percent of the party constituents). But 
a huge number of Højre working-class voters migrated to the Social Democratic Party during the 
1890s, after legislation enabled the national party to be established in the late 1880s. Thus, by 
the late 1890s Højre consisted mostly of employers and bureaucrats and struggled to represent 
all employers, regardless of sectoral splits on economic questions of the day.29 
Second, leaders of the cooperation-oriented faction of Højre helped to create the peak 
employers’ association for their own political purposes—to unify its core industrial constituency. 
The Employers’ Federation of 1896 (that became Dansk Arbejdsgiversforening, da) was founded 
by Niels Andersen (a Højre member, and later party leader of parliament, and a construction 
industry employer) and Vilhelm Køhler (a brick factory director) to show that Højre could produce 
a middle-way politics between the older conservative legacy and the new social democratic 
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challenge.30 
Third, the employers’ federation sought to develop as a highly coordinated association, in 
order to influence public policy, obtain the right to self-regulation, and gain industrial peace. 
While many stress the group’s interest in labor peace, policy influence was equally important; for 
example, in a commemoration of da’s first twenty-five years, the authors claimed that “the most 
important evidence of the organization’s energy and vision was its contribution to the solution of 
the question about insurance against workers’ accidents.”31 The left had proposed a major 
workers’ accident insurance reform along the lines of the German model, with benefits tied to the 
wage earner and controlled by a worker fund. The employers favored a citizen-based and 
tax-financed alternative and Niels Andersen proposed that it be administered by a Labor 
Insurance Council, rather than as either a direct state program or a private program. The 
employers’ federation sought to unify all employers around its position and waged a campaign to 
bring the handicraft sectors into the employers’ federation.32 
The other central goal of the employers’ association was to achieve industrial peace. To 
this end the federation issued a regulation stating: “No inequality between employers and 
workers concerning the work relationship (including, for example, wages and performance) 
should give rise to work stoppages from either side. This inequality should, instead, be settled 
with a compromise or an arbitration.” Niels Andersen had to work to convince employers to 
accept this vision of industrial peace, and the greatest resistance came from the iron industry, led 
by S. C. Hauberg, who initially favored a politics of confrontation with labor. The Employers 
Federation intervened in a labor dispute within the metal industry in 1897 and suggested a labor 
court (Arbejdsdomstol) to avoid future strikes. Niels Andersen also sought to organize labor 
during this episode, to promote its side of the progress in the iron industry conflict and to urge the 
early labor organization (DsF) to play the same leadership role in negotiations that da was 
attempting to do on the employers’ side. Scholars credit these actions with being largely 
responsible for the centralized form of the Danish lo: indeed, employers actually organized at a 
national level before Danish workers and the Employers’ Association ultimately succeeded in 
getting the industrial court it wanted with its establishment of the Joint Committee of 1898 
(Fællesudvalget af 1898).33 
Fourth, both employers and their government allies feared that the employer voice would 
be diluted after the parliamentary reform, due, in part, to the structure of multiparty competition. 
Consequently, there was an incentive for business interests to seek to have policy-making 
delegated to private channels of representation. Coming parliamentary reform threatened the 
power of the Right Party (Højre), and a faction of the party determined that coordination with 
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other parties and social actors was essential for maintaining its influence. Højre’s initial defense 
against the rising social democratic challenge was to form a center-right alliance with the farmers’ 
party, Venstre. The result of this experiment was the loss of a quarter of the party’s members of 
parliament in the 1892 and 1895 elections. Højre had already begun forming voting committees 
among the electorate, and the employers’ association was akin to this earlier effort. The desire 
for industrial self-regulation was also responsible for the very moderate line taken by employers 
after winning a major trade battle, the “Great Lockout” of 1899. The September compromise 
established employers’ control over the organization of work and transferred power over labor 
policy to the social partners, while retaining a supervisory role for government.34 
Finally, the resolution of the conflicts surrounding the origins of the employers’ 
associations created important policy legacies: the dedicated business party Højre would remain 
closely connected to the employers’ association, and the social partners would collaborate in 
collective bargaining and policy negotiations with the state at a highly centralized level. The 
impact of business unity within the party on the evolution of a collective voice of business within 
the employers’ association is made clear by the sequence of events following the introduction of 
full proportional representation in 1915. With the advent of PR, Højre was reorganized into the 
Conservative People’s Party, becoming an even purer business party than it had been by the 
1890s. This political consolidation of the nation’s employers reduced regional differences among 
industrialists and enabled a stronger centralization of authority within da in the 1919, when all 
vestiges of regional distinctions were removed and the organization was reorganized along 
functional lines.35  
 
The Case of Britain 
The dynamics of partisan competition also demonstrate how Britain came to create 
fragmented, pluralist employers’ associations, despite enormous efforts to the contrary. While 
employers, labor, and the state periodically sought to develop capacities for coordination 
(explaining why Britain appears somewhat corporatist at various times in its history), these efforts 
were repressed in the dynamics of two-party competition. 
First, given that Britain lacked a dedicated business party in its largely two-party system, 
employers were dispersed across parties. Initially, more industrialists belonged to the Liberal 
Party; but the party also included ideological proponents of liberalism and many workers. 
Employers began to migrate to the Conservative Party or to the splinter Liberal Unionist faction 
when the Liberal Party was rent asunder by the Irish Question in 1886; however, the 
Conservatives also did a poor job meeting business needs. While the Liberal ideological 
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commitment to liberalism made the party adverse to industrial development policies, the 
Conservatives, albeit more open ideologically to old Tory notions of organic coordination, had 
ties to the landed gentry and to financial interests that led them to block policies beneficial to 
industrialists. Before the war (in 1914), ninety-four manufacturers were members of the House of 
Commons: sixty-four of these were Liberals and thirty were Unionists; eighty-one members from 
commerce and finance were divided nearly equally among the parties. After the war the 
Conservatives became the “bosses party.”36 The prewar partisan divisions among employers did 
not merely play out along industrial sector lines as even firms within industry were divided on the 
tariff issue, and the issue of Home Rule worked against easy reconciliation of employers’ 
interests. By 1901 a majority of employers (apart from those who produced staples products and 
financial interests) came to support protection, and even many cotton industrialists wanted some 
tariffs. While the Labor Party was also beginning to emerge during this period, it largely voted 
with the Liberals and supplanted the Liberal Party altogether after the Great War, thus preserving 
the structure of two-party competition.37  
Second, the role of two-party competition initially helps to explain the absence of a 
national-level British employer organization at the end of the nineteenth century, when 
employers elsewhere were moving to form national organizations. Employers were distributed 
electorally between the Conservative and Liberal Parties and lacked a forum in which to consider 
their broader collective political interests. Moreover, neither party was motivated to organize a 
national business organization from the top down to serve its electoral needs.  
Yet a national peak association (the Federation of British Industries, or FBI) was finally 
organized during the First World War, when partisan infighting and the lack of coordination 
became intolerable, and the long arm of the state had a role in its creation. While the FBI was 
officially organized by industrialist Dudley Docker, there is considerable evidence that 
Conservative Party activists, and especially Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, were deeply involved.38 
Docker had been quite close to Steel-Maitland since the latter ran for office in 1906; for example, 
Docker offered to lend Steel-Maitland one or two of his Daimler cars during the 1906 campaign. 
Docker was the only “considerable subscriber” in Steel-Maitland’s reorganized East Birmingham 
Conservative Association in 1914 and Steel-Maitland was on the verge of joining the board of 
Docker’s company when he was offered the job of Under Secretary of the Colonies in 1915. 
Steel-Maitland and Docker had a scheme for privately training Birmingham men as officers, a 
scheme that Docker would finance, but it ran into difficulty with the military command. Finally, in 
November of 1915, a few months before the FBI organizing meeting, Docker and Steel-Maitland 
had a secret correspondence, hand carried by a Mr. Malcolm, “who is perfectly confidential.”39 
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The Conservatives were motivated to form FBI, in part, to seek organizational help in their 
battles with the Liberal Party; for example, they asked the FBI to support locating a department to 
control commercial intelligence in foreign countries within the Foreign Office. The FBI was also 
asked to weigh in on a plan for reconstruction and, in particular, to support the Conservative 
desires to sustain economic stimulus over the Liberal Party’s priority (in keeping with its close 
ties to financial interests) for protecting the pound in foreign monetary exchange. Steel-Maitland 
was deeply interested in social and economic coordination and wanted desperately to unify 
British employers and labor in the common cause of creating a domestic production machine that 
would match the needs of the war effort, sustaining the party’s imperial ambitions, and 
supporting its highly articulated vision of industrial development policies. Finally, the creation of 
the FBI should be viewed as a constituency-building exercise and a logical continuation of 
SteelMaitland’s broader campaign to expand the network of local conservative groups. He 
implemented this campaign during his tenure as party chair and described himself as “a party 
manager with an intelligence service through the country!”40 In this vein, he wrote to Bonar Law: 
The war has obliterated many old Party distinctions. . . . Classes have joined in 
the prosecution of the war and the true national view for the future must be that 
new questions, new differences of opinion, new groupings of men may arise, 
while those who have often combated one another over the old questions may 
find themselves largely in sympathy over the new.41 
The Foreign Office was determined to make the FBI work and lent Roland Nugent and 
Guy Locock to FBI to help the association mobilize its constituency. At the first annual meeting 
Dudley Docker emphatically recognized the enormous contribution of government bureaucrats, 
stating: “Perhaps I may be allowed to say here how greatly we were indebted in the early days to 
Mr. Tait for the assistance he gave in the formation of this association. . . . Next, we come to Mr. 
Nugent, whom, you will remember, the Foreign Office were kind enough to allow to come to us 
and who has filled the post of director and secretary . . . in an extremely able manner.”42  
Third, the organizers of the employers’ association initially had ambitions for a high 
degree of coordination among business, labor, and the state, wanted considerable industrial 
policy-making to be delegated to the private sector, and sought to model itself after the Swedish 
peak employers’ federation. At the first annual meeting the FBI’s founder, Dudley Docker, 
explained: “One of the principal objects with which the Federation has been formed is to 
command the attention of the Government of this country when framing industrial legislation. In 
regard to which we shall hope to be of some service, not merely to manufacturers, but to the 
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community as a whole.”43 As occurred in Denmark, Docker wanted substantial industrial 
policy-making authority to be delegated to the private sector, sought to create a “Business 
Parliament” for making industrial policy, sorely regretted Britain’s lack of a dedicated political 
party for manufacturers (feeling that the Liberals, in particular, had failed to respect industrialists), 
and wanted “to transform Britain into a model corporatist state.” As the Globe (owned by Docker) 
expressed in an editorial entitled, “The Party or the State?”: “The party system has been carried 
on to unnecessary lengths” such that it has “become deliberative only in name. . . . It is the 
reason why so much of our legislation is inefficient, even when not injurious, to our commercial 
interests.”44 
Fourth, the FBI’s corporatist ambitions were diminished by party politics. Neither party 
could speak definitively for business, and both parties (and warring governmental departments) 
cultivated their own set of employers. Just as the Conservatives cultivated the Federation of 
British Industries, Prime Minister Lloyd George and the Board of Labor nurtured a group called 
the National Conference of Employers’ Organisations (drawn from the former free-trade 
contingent), and the two groups competed for power. The FBI’s corporatist ambitions were also 
thwarted by limited party incentives to cede policy-making privilege to organized business and 
labor—each party hoped to win a majority through legislative channels. Business and labor 
initially supported cooperation through the National Industrial Conference, yet Parliament 
refused to delegate authority to an industrial council. At this point the employers’ and labor 
organizations came to believe that cooperation was impossible: neither side wished to cede 
control over industrial relations unless it felt that it would have some input into the process.45 
Unlike in Denmark, where a system of self-regulation was created with the development of the 
corporatist business and labor organizations, the British state retained firm control over industrial 
relations.  
Finally, the failure of these early efforts to significantly develop labor-market coordination 
gave way to a heightened state of class conflict and deep skepticism about government solutions. 
Party politics so disgusted employers that “coalitionists” from both major parties (dominated by 
employers) contemplated forming a Centre Party. The electoral rules and path dependencies of 
the party structure prevented the emergence of a new party, but the experiment reflects the 
depth of disappointment with the current system.46 Viewing German coordination with great 
admiration, Winston Churchill, famously remarked, “We are organised for nothing except party 
politics.”47 Although Britain later tried to achieve coordination, liberalism was renegotiated at 
each developmental juncture due both to legacies of earlier failures in cooperative experiments 
and to the type of partisan conflict inherent in two-party systems. 
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The Case of Germany 
It is puzzling that Germany, with its strong state tradition, came to create a system of 
sectoral coordination in which the social partners largely develop and implement labor-market 
policy without much input from the state. We suggest that the dynamics of federal, multiparty 
competition contributed to the emergence of a medium level of industrial coordination in 
Germany: the weak and regionally diverse nature of party competition produced business parties 
at the regional level but not at the national level. Immediately before the German revolution in 
1918, business-oriented bureaucrats were motivated to unify employers into a peak association 
and to delegate power to labor-market partners, in order to stave off more radical parliamentary 
reforms. This effort produced the Reichverband. Yet with the continuing absence of strong 
parties during the Weimar years, employers remained skeptical of their political representation 
by the party system and struggled to retain private control over industrial relations. In addition, 
without a unifying dedicated business party (similar to the Danish Conservative People’s Party), 
the German national peak association never managed to unify diverse constituencies (as 
happened with the Danish peak association after 1919). With the rise of the National Socialist 
Party, the state essentially took over industrial life; but after the war employers lobbied to return 
industrial relations to a private system of sector coordination that resembled the Weimar system. 
First, the federal multiparty system in Germany gave rise to business-oriented parties in 
the nineteenth century but did not produce a single, national dedicated business party; rather, 
parties drew uneven support across regions and employers remained dispersed across parties. 
The Law of Association forbade centralized political parties in Prussia until 1899 and local parties 
were only loosely connected to parliamentary parties. Strong regional economic differences also 
worked against both dedicated business parties and unitary peak employers’ associations: 
heavy industry and agricultural estates favored protection, while lighter, export industries favored 
free trade. And these conflicts played out in bureaucratic struggles.48 Yet even when trade 
divisions began to diminish and even though some parties (such as the National Liberals) 
counted both heavy and light industrialists among their members, the federal nature of the 
German political system constrained the emergence of parties with broad national representation. 
After World War I and the revolution, politicians tried to develop more organized, clearly defined 
parties, yet employers remained dispersed among the diverse right parties. The Weimar parties 
splintered so much that by 1929 there were twenty-nine parties in the Reichstag, and of those 
only nine had legislative influence.49 
Second, as happened elsewhere, business-oriented bureaucrats were heavily involved in 
the creation of the peak employers’ associations and were motivated by their own political 
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purposes. The story played out a bit differently in Germany than it did in Denmark, for example, 
because bureaucrats rather than party leaders took the lead after World War I and were 
motivated by the very weakness of parties to seek other sources of political support. An initial 
effort at association building happened in 1876, when Wilhelm von Kardorff, a close friend of 
Bismarck’s and member of parliament from the small manufacturers’ Free Conservative Party, 
formed the Central Association of German Industrialists (Centralverbund Deutscher Industrieller, 
or cvI) to advance tariff reform and to build support for tariff candidates in the upcoming 
election.50 Kardorff ’s widely publicized pamphlet, “Against the Current,” was influenced by the 
American Henry Carey, who also inspired Lincoln’s national development policies; Kardorff 
described the political links of the association in his correspondence with Carey. In October 1878 
the coalition of industrialist and agrarian protectionists won a majority in the Reichstag, and in the 
December 1878 election, aided by the Centralverbund, protectionist voters turned out in heavy 
numbers.51 The Centralverbund was very much an association for large industry. Consequently, 
Liberal politicians, who were closer to the free-trade, consumer-product wing of business, sought 
in the 1890s to create a source of countervailing power in the Bund der Industriellen. Liberal 
politician Gustav Stresemann spearheaded the effort to expand the Bund into a national 
association.52 This dual structure resulted in employers being dispersed across parties, industrial 
sectors, regions, and associations. 
German bureaucrats tried periodically to unify employers and assisted in creating the 
Reich Association of German Industry (RDI) in 1919 by uniting the two existing groups. Motivated 
to sustain wartime economic coordination and to stave off threats of revolution, corporatism was 
viewed as an alternative to socialism. But without much party leadership, bureaucrats rather than 
party politicians guided the association building. There was considerable infighting between the 
Centralverbund and BdK sides (represented by Stinnes and Stresemann) and Stresemann was 
vetoed by Hugenberg and Stinnes from joining the directorate. One of the new managers of the 
Reich Association, Hermann Bucher, came directly from the German Foreign Office, and Joseph 
Koeth (a successor of Walter Rathenau in the Raw Materials Division of the Prussian War 
Ministry) came from the Demobilization Office. Koeth wanted to delegate policy-making privilege 
to business and labor and believed that industrial committees should be allowed to regulate 
themselves.53 
Third, a desire for coordination motivated the development of the rdI. The intensive needs 
of the German war machine motivated the formation of institutions for coordination during World 
War I and quasi-public corporations (Kriegswirtschaftsgesellschaften) were formed to organize 
production in each industrial sector. The architect of the German war economy, Walter Rathenau, 
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had a vision for peacetime reconstruction along the same lines. Every industry was to integrate 
firms into an association and all associations would belong to a national group that would 
(sometimes with labor) engage in self-government. Although Rathenau was forced out of power 
and later assassinated, his ideas inspired the creation of cooperative cartels. Negotiations for 
cooperative peacetime policies between business and labor (the Stinnes-Legien Accord) began 
in 1917, even before the German revolution.54 
Fourth, fearing a revolution, business-oriented bureaucrats and employers sought to 
have public policy-making delegated to private organizations. Worried about the possibility of 
major losses in legislative struggles, employers concluded that economic democracy was 
preferable to socialism. German industrialists were on the defensive after the war and viewed 
corporatism as the means to regain some power. Jakob Reichert (Union of German Iron and 
Steel Industrialists) explained his disdain for Junkers and the middle class, and remarked: “Allies 
for industry could be found only among the workers.”55 But the German peak association never 
managed to achieve the strength of the parallel Danish organization. In Denmark the 
reorganized Conservative People’s Party included most employers and helped to unify the 
political voice of business; subsequently, the employers’ federation reorganized along functional 
lines. In Germany the absence of a single dedicated business party constrained the emergence 
of full-blown macrocorporatism. Employers continued to be distributed across parties (such as 
the Democratic Party, the Catholic Center Party, the German People’s Party, and the German 
National People’s Party). Party politics hampered the business-labor effort to plan for postwar 
contingencies, led employers to distrust the party system, and contributed to considerable 
infighting within the rdI over leadership and policy. The high hopes for the Reich Association of 
German Industry failed to pan out, as the organization remained a rather loose-knit peak 
association and real decision-making power was retained at the lower, sector level.56 Thus a 
leader in the organization, Paul Silverberg, stated in 1922 that the Reich Association was 
“nothing other than a really loose peak association, which can impose very few rules on its 
members, branch associations and individual firms, can commit them to nothing, and in which 
there is a lot of talking.”57 
 
The Case of the United States 
We have fully reported the American story elsewhere and, therefore, will note only briefly 
that the structure of two-party competition in the United States also dashed hopes for high levels 
of coordination among employers.58 First, the United States failed to develop a dedicated 
business party, although the Republican Party at the end of the nineteenth century often seemed 
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to speak for employers. While American manufacturers in the Northeast and Midwest were 
Republicans, industrialists in the South and West voted Democratic, as they did not wish to 
participate in a party with African Americans and were bitter about the war. 
Second, Republican Party activists were deeply involved with the development of the first 
national umbrella association in the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM).59 The McKinley campaign sought to mobilize employers through the nam in order to reach 
across partisan lines to promote his candidacy in the 1896 election and to augment support for 
the party’s industrial policy agenda. NAM’s creators viewed the business organization as an agent 
for political nationalization and a vehicle for organizing manufacturers across sectional divides. 
The New York Times recorded the most significant event at nam’s second annual meeting as 
“the applause which greeted a mention of the name of Major McKinley. This applause told as 
plainly as could a preamble and resolution the real purpose of the delegates.”60 
Third, NAM’s initial policy positions reflected a vision of industrial cooperation that 
resembled positions taken by European employers: the association lobbied for a department of 
commerce and—in true corporatist fashion—wanted to be licensed as the legitimate spokesman 
for employers in cooperative business-government arrangements.61 
But, fourth, party politics—dynamics of regionally dominated two-party 
competition—worked against the realization of NAM’s corporatist aspirations. Congressional 
representatives from the South and West voted against nam’s legislative proposals (such as the 
formation of a department of commerce and the granting of a national charter to the association), 
because they viewed these policies as advantaging Eastern and Midwestern manufacturers. Left 
without its anticipated central role in managing the transition to industrial capitalism, NAM started 
to wither away at the end of the century and only gained new life when it reconstituted itself as an 
organization devoted to fighting organized labor in 1903. Finally, this critical juncture signaled a 
setback for coordination in the American political economy and strengthened the liberal impulse 
among U.S. employers. 
 
Conclusion 
The seeds of capitalist organization were sown at the end of the nineteenth century, 
when employers and their government collaborators struggled to transform the regulatory 
environment to privilege industry over agriculture. To this end, organizers in both the state and 
the private sector sought to develop high levels of coordination among the social partners, with 
the result that associations of the social partners were important actors in the break with the 
preindustrial structures of the ancien régime. Yet some countries produced macrocorporatism, in 
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which the economic and political activities of business and labor were highly coordinated, 
nationally focused, and endowed with significant state support. Others delivered a system of 
sector coordination, in which coordinated industrial relations were largely left under the control of 
private channels of self-governance by the social partners. Finally, in some countries employers 
had great difficulty finding common ground, had fewer political reasons to negotiate with labor, 
and formed fragmented “pluralist” groups. 
We have argued that because leadership for association building came from the state, 
the political rules of the game were crucial to outcomes. The structure of party competition and 
state centralization shaped incentives for strategic coordination for both political actors and 
employers. Dedicated business parties were likely to develop in countries with multiparty 
systems and strong centralized governments, and regional business parties developed under 
conditions of multiparty competition and federal governmental structures. In these countries, 
where no single party was likely to gain power, parties had an incentive to nurture private 
associational channels for policy-making, and these produced macrocorporatist groups and 
systems of sectoral coordination. Two party systems had electoral incentives to cultivate 
business constituencies; but lacking a dedicated business party and incentives to delegate 
power, business groups remained pluralist and highly fragmented. 
These insights into the origins of peak employers’ organization also have implications for 
the origins of corporatism and pluralism. While employers of various industrial nations all sought 
institutions for coordination at the dawn of industrial capitalism, they had profoundly different 
success rates that reflected the political climate in which they waged the struggle to project their 
industrial goals. We suggest that the resolution of the political conflicts at the birth of associations 
had a lasting impact on industrial relations, national systems of regulation, and the future 
potential for coordinated competitive strategies: cross-national variations in employers’ 
association led to fundamentally different patterns of business engagement with the state for a 
century to come. 
This work has significance for our understanding of institutional innovation. We subscribe 
to a punctuated-equilibria model of institutional change, in which the resolution of political 
conflicts at critical junctures creates lasting institutional legacies. Yet while we appreciate the 
important role for agency in these transitional moments, we move beyond agency to theorize the 
political structural constraints on strategic action. In this way, we endorse other recent work that 
accords a primary place to political parties,62 while focusing rather more on the structure of party 
competition that shapes agency. 
Our research also has important theoretical implications for the understudied construction 
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of business preferences for economic and social policies. Comparative scholars often assume 
fundamental differences in firms’ preferences within coordinated and liberal market economies, 
and trace these preferences back to preindustrial guilds.63 While we accept that images of 
industrialization are influenced by older estate and guild traditions, we also view interests as 
socially constructed and receptive to politics.64 Thus, while the scant research on the origins of 
employer organizations usually attributes causality to industrial development or working-class 
mobilization, we add political structural determinants. Moreover, while scholars commonly root 
political party development in the structure of societal cleavages, we emphasize the inverse, by 
looking at how parties influence the construction of class cleavages.65 
Thus, the work also has bearing on the evolution of diverse forms of industrial capitalism, 
as it addresses an important pillar in the institu- tional underpinnings in the varieties of capitalism. 
With our hitherto untold story about the political origins of national associations, we reveal that 
stylized facts and an absence of dialogue between business historians and students of party 
politics have left us rather blind to the enormous importance of political structures in the evolution 
of corporate cooperation. Patterns of political engagement (even in pre-democratic regimes), as 
well as protocorporatist structures, matter, and incentives for both state and labor-market actors 
contribute to cross-national variations in peak business groups. Politics as well as economics 
has a role in the origins of models of capitalism. 
Finally, the analysis has important real-world implications for social solidarity and equality. 
Americans often take as a given the current spirit of atomistic individualism; yet if one believes in 
the reconstructive powers of associations and electoral politics, hope may yet remain for those 
who seek cooperative collective action to address the challenges of postindustrialization. Like 
Nixon opening China, employers—if given a forum to articulate their collective interests—could 
help build support for public policies to enhance human capital. An essential concern is whether 
the institutions for coordination that developed during the golden age of manufacturing can 
survive in the postindustrial age. States must respond to changing economic conditions and cure 
earlier welfare traps; yet their ultimate success in continuing to provide collective social goods 
may depend on their ability to build new coalitions of broad majorities. For these reasons, it is 
essential that we understand the historical context of the construction of coalitions and 
institutions that support both economic efficiency and social solidarity. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 reports the level of employer organization in two ways. First, along the 
macrocorporatist dimension, we report a continuous index of formal organization and 
representational articulation. Our measure is an additive index of three component measures: (1) 
scope of employers’ organization (that is, the share of employers organized in national peak 
associations; (2) the centralization of power (for example, control over strike/lockout funds, 
bargaining strategies) in national peak associations; and (3) the integration of national 
associations into national policy-making forums. Each country-decade is scored 1, 2, or 3 (where 
1 is minimal and 3 is high) on each component dimension. While one could infer with confidence 
that high levels of organization correspond with macrocorporatist coordination, and intermediate 
levels equate with sectoral coordination, we actually compute broader indices for 
macrocorporatist coordination and sectoral coordination. 
For macrocorporatism, we combine our index of employer organization with a directly 
comparable measure of labor organization and collective bargaining centralization. As the 
correlation between this measure and our focal measure of employers displayed in Table 1 is 
very high (r = .95), we utilize only the employers measure for the present illustration of 
macrocorporatist organization. 
Second, we report an additive index of sector coordination, which is composed of similar 
1–3 scaled measures of the extent of sector coordination to provide (commonly within economic 
sectors) collective business goods (that is, training, research and development, export marketing, 
and industrial development strategies) and the strength of long-term finance and producer 
relations (that is, reliance on bank finance and institutional bank-producer linkages). Both 
macrocorporatism and sector cooperation indices are expressed as standard (z) scores to 
facilitate comparison.66 
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Appendix A – Tables 
Table 1: Patterns of Employers’ Organization: Macrocorporatism and Sector 
Coordination, 1900-1938 
 
 
 
SOURCES: See text and appendix for details on measures of macrocorporatism and sector coordination. 
Detailed information and data sources for all component of these measures are available at 
www.marquette.edu/polisci/fculty_swank.shtml. 
a Employers organization measured circa 1921-22. 
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Table 2: Political Institutions and Employers Organization at the Dawn of the 
Twentieth Century: Theoretical Predictions, Nations, and Modes of 
Organization 
 
 
